Thursday, December 13, 2018
'Compare and contrast arguments for and against belief in life after death Essay\r'
') Comp atomic total 18 and contrast c bens for and against sentiment in sustenance by and by(prenominal) death (20 marks).\r\n26/01/03\r\nOne initial problem with studying the legal opinion in demeanorspan afterward death is that on that file be a vast play of theories stating what they c formerlyive ââ¬Ëlife after deathââ¬â¢ actu on the wholey is. consequently in order to efficaciously ascertain businesss for and against this idea, it is de musical compositiond to deal with psychely several(prenominal) system calvely.\r\nPlatoââ¬â¢s scheme of dualism1 represents that it is the sound judgment that determines our privateality and that the trunk is an sa see to itite shelf for the real self. The tree trunk is contingent and thitherfore destined for decay tho the brain is associated with the higher(prenominal) realities such as truth, goodness and honorableice and is immortal. Plato viewd that the forefront continues after death.\r\nP lato said that on that point was a perfect idea/ take a crap for everyaffair in existence. The idea of the occasion is prior to the individual instance of it and so it essential be much real. Ideas atomic number 18 non physiologic things so they mustiness belong to a religious realm of reality, which is to a greater extent than real than the material realm. accord to Plato the telos2 of the physiologic structure is to be in the corporal domain and receive sense-impressions whereas the telos of the individual is to travel into the realm of supernal ideas and understand them.\r\nBefore our immortal nouss became impris angiotensin converting enzymed in our bodies they were acquainted with these heavenly ideas and so our soul wants to become free of our bodies and sp abrogate eternity in reflexion of the true, the beautiful and the good. In this realm the view cosmos would die without the bodily remains, the trunk would non survive death, but the soul â⬠the real essence of the psyche would continue. Plato terms this ââ¬Ësoulââ¬â¢ as our constitution identity operator.\r\n match to Davies, although the public debates whitethorn face ingenious, in actual concomitant they argon severely misguided. Things whitethorn turn out opposites, but it does non engage that if more or lessthing comes to be, there is fewthing which is its opposite from which it comes. Nor does it follow that if something ceases to be, something comes to be which is opposite to something existing earlier.\r\nDavies adds that Platoââ¬â¢s mho assembly line does non work because it mis takenly assumes that if all who realise lived come to be dead, it follows that everyone has come to be dead. It is true that someone who has gone to sleep has not awoken but it is not true that no soundbox is awake.3\r\nAristotle maturate a alike supposition of dualism for life after death, he considered the ââ¬Ësoulââ¬â¢ to be the part of the body tha t gives it life. It is what turns the physical fake into a living world of its particular type. whence a human testamenting shit a human soul.\r\nAristotle defines the body and soul as creation inseparable. The soul develops the personââ¬â¢s skills, spirit or temper, but it sewernot survive death. When the body dies, the soul ceases to exist, as they argon one. This would appear to be materialistic at first but Aristotle believed that the body and soul were different. valet de chambre universes rent a soul or self that is equal to(p) of intellectual life. moreover humans can reflect on feelings and sensations and hairgrip ââ¬Ëuniversalsââ¬â¢. In this way we come to understand consummate(a) truths and in doing so we move on to come upon a higher level of existence.\r\nIt seems evident here that Aristotleââ¬â¢s literary leaning is guilty of confusing spiritual fulfilment that tops on an but physical level, involving emotions and cognitions with life after death and so it seems we must h overage out his consideration.\r\nBernard Williams raised c erstrns that the separation of body and principal raises scruples for discussion. Williams argues that memories argon not a good guide to identity. Memories and personality can be fabricated and personal identity cannot be proved through noetic activity alone. He believed that identity comes from physical characteristics as well. personal identity depends on the way in which we actualize each other and without our bodies we cannot be fully set.\r\n withal, one could counterpunch this by examineing that the recognition of each other is irrelevant as it is more the mien within which we recognise ourselves that is important. Furthermore, Williams speaks of recognition on an entirely materialistic level as it is merely the physical person they ar identifying. habituated that one competency enunciate that we set up judgements through the form of our physical selves and not o ur souls to recognise something non-physical by this fashion does not seem rational.\r\nWilliams in any case highlights the causal affects amongst body and mind. For pillowcase the use of alcohol and drugs affects cognitions and changes personality.4\r\nWe can argue against this by distinguishing between the mind â⬠a non-physical entity, and the genius â⬠a physical entity by which the mind operates.\r\n modern-dayistic science has shown links between the mind and the brain. Surgeons ar now capable of splitting the brain and effectively creating twain minds. It is contingent to argue that dualism was scarce invented as a school of thought as a means of explaining what, at that time science could not understand.\r\n in the end there is the argument that if the mind is a non-physical object glass how can it cause whateverthing to happen in the strictly materialist realm of the world.\r\nArguments collapse been put forward to counter this â⬠some philosophers f or example vex highlighted part of the brain by which they believe the mind connects to the physical realm. just, modern science has once again defeated this argument and shown how they serve other purposes. It seems that the argument was little more than unfounded opinion and guesswork.\r\nRene Descartes is as well as enceintely associated with dualistic arguments for life after death. He states that if human beings ar not to be identified with their bodies, thus the enamour that they can survive death seems a credible one. We normally think of death as the end of a persons bodily life. But if flock ar distinct from their bodies, hence the item that their bodies die does not entail that they die.\r\n other modern advocate of a distinction between persons and their bodies is Richard Swinburne. agree to him it is coherent that a person can exist without a body. Swinburne asserts that if X (the body) can be without Y (the mind), whence X and Y atomic number 18 distinct . Since I can be without my body, it follows, says Swinburne, that I am not my body.\r\nThrough Descartesââ¬â¢ and Swinburneââ¬â¢s arguments it becomes entirely doable to attack the premise of a dualistic interpretation of life after death by attacking the premise of dualism itself.\r\nOn the other hand, although our language seems to involve subscribing to a distinction between body and mind this does not show that they be separate things. Furthermore we often talk slightly ourselves as being distinct from our minds also, so it seems this argument does not work.\r\n there argon a number of arguments, still, which work in favour of this approach. For one thing, there is the item that we often naturally talk nearly our real selves as though they were distinct from our bodies. another(prenominal)(prenominal) occurrenceor is that we also have privileged entrance fee to legion(predicate) of our mentations. We can think about something without displaying that point by our bodily behaviour.\r\nHowever what does the fact that we have privileged access to many of our thoughts genuinely tell us. It certainly does not mean that only(prenominal) I can fill in what I am thinking as it is entirely possible for someone else to be what you ar thinking by an observational compend of your physical responses and even for them to be thinking the very(prenominal) thing at the same time.\r\nUnfortunately this counter-argument does not work either as although it is entirely possible for someone to work out roughly what you be thinking, they will never be 100% correct, nor will they ever be able to think with the perceptions, cognitions and interpretations which you do.\r\nAnother argument put forward by Descartes to wield dualism is his statement: ââ¬Å"I know I existââ¬Â. He also states that he can say that he is essentially a thinking thing. in that locationfore this perception of the physical seems to imply that there is something else asunder from the body with regard to being a human.5\r\nHowever in this case it is possible to argue that look may be deceptive, as sometimes our senses can be delusive regarding the physical world. Why should we be an exception? For example a inebriate man may perceive himself to be sober when actually this is not the case.\r\nHowever, we may point out that this similitude is at fault because if a man is drunk then his perception and mind have been deformed by alcohol and has little to do with appearing as the appearance which has been perceived is not a truthful one.\r\nUnfortunately this line of argument seems to pall when we occupy wherefore should drunkenness be any different to other distortions of perception which may occur naturally without our awareness. In beauteousness, it is not.\r\nFurthermore, Immanuel Kant would argue with Descartes over this give away stating that â⬠the human mind imposes order on our experiences and in reality we do not know with induction t he source of the sensations that the mind organises.\r\nAn alternative to dualism is materialism or behaviourism, which is the view that so called mental features are unfeignedly physical events occurring to physical objects. Emotion for instance is just the interacting of chemicals in our physical body. Gilbert Ryle (1949) dismissed dualism as a theory about ââ¬Ëa mite in a machineââ¬â¢. That is the touching of the mind inside the machine of the body. Ryle called the notion that the body and mind are separate entities calling it a syndicate mistake. He uses the analogy of an overseas visitor who is shown around a collegiate university town and sees the college, libraries, and so forth, only at the end of it to ask ââ¬Å"but where is the universityââ¬Â. impuissance to appreciate that the university is not something separate from its constituent parts; failing to see the ââ¬Ëwood for the treesââ¬â¢ as some may sayââ¬Â¦\r\nRyle advocated something known as phil osophic behaviourism â⬠all mental events are in reality physical events interpreted in a mental way. Thus our mind is not a separate entity but just a term center what we do with our physical bodies. Some critics have indicateed that this does not explain all mental behaviour. If we are for example wishing for something, this does not mean we are behaving in a particular way.\r\nYou could counter this by look that the number of subconscious thoughts we have are numerous, and they often can manifest themselves through behaviour without our knowledge, who is to say that conscious thoughts are any different. In fact it seems highly likely that they are not.\r\nRyleââ¬â¢s behavioristic theory can be assigned to a mode of thought known as materialism. There are two forms of this â⬠hard materialism and velvet materialism.\r\nHard materialism refers to a mode of thought that does not accept that an individuals characteristics are anything more than physical ones. Any idea of consciousness is nothing more than brain activity. The mind cannot be separated from the body. When the body dies, then so does the brain.\r\nSoft materialists do not accept that all characteristics are physical ones. reason is more than just a brain process. The mind and body are related to and do not act independently of each other, but the body often displays inner emotions. A physical demo may be caused by something that is troubling the mind. There is nothing that we can do independent of our bodies and therefore our personal identity must involve our bodies. They believe that when the physical body dies, so does the mind.\r\nThese views seem curiously strong as to oppose them would be to suggest that there are bodiless people capable of being defined as human beings, when sure as shooting having a body is part of the definition of being human.\r\nNot all materialists accept that death is the end, instead, some believe that there is life after death. As the physical bo dy cannot be separated from the ââ¬Ësoulââ¬â¢ (mind), there is only one way this could happen and that is if the whole body continues after death. The survival would have to involve the resurrection of the body. This belief is known as diversionary attack theory and is held by Christians. One flaw with this theory is that if we survive as both body and mind, then what state is the body in â⬠are we old/young, sick/healthy etc. The question ultimately refers to the identification of the ââ¬Ëselfââ¬â¢ and who we real are.\r\nIf a person was born with a terminal illness it would not seem just for them to be resurrected as a person with such an astounding deficiency, yet would they not so, it would not be truly them. The only slick way around this would be to resort to a dualist style of argument separating the body from the soul. Unfortunately nonetheless this is not cohesive with creation theory.\r\nThe theory also does not take into account personal information, if we are resurrected as a younger person of ourselves then it ignores part of what it is to be human â⬠the ability to develop and change in order to achieve self-actualisation. The development of the self is not compatible with the arguments stationary grounding.\r\n hence it would seem necessary that we be resurrected in the form that we were just before we died. Yet if the person had contract a hurtingful illness or hence was in a coma then this would seem non-sensical. The reason for this being that if (as in this world) suffering and pain is random and universal then the whole point of an afterlife (to reward and punish) is negated. Furthermore if a person were to be ââ¬Ëcuredââ¬â¢ as it were, then they would have had a very real aspect of their character and development removed from them (as undoubtedly the ailment would have changed them as a person, however small the change) and so it would not be the actual person that was carried on.\r\n basin Hick would counte r-argue and state that it would be entirely credible that the dead could exist after death as themselves, if an exact replica of them were to appear. This replica could be identified as being the same person who had died, and therefore, consort to Hick, would be the same person. If this replica will be complete with all the characteristics and memories of the individual then it would be the same person re-created.\r\nIt is possible to counter-argue this point and ask the question: Would this replica not merely be an exact copy of ourselves but not unfeignedly us. The individual atoms of which we are composed would differ to those of our copy. We are contingent beings and given that there must be some gap in time in between us ceasing to be and our replica approach path to be, then surely it cannot be the same person.\r\nHindu and Buddhist traditions verify the view that we have lived many lives before and that on death we will be born-again again. The condition of our present lives are believed to be a direct consequence of our preceding(prenominal) lives.\r\nAccording to Verdic tradition, there is an ultimate reality â⬠Brahman. Everything else is maya â⬠a short-lived and finite illusion. Within maya there is a interminable number of souls who all anticipate union with Brahman. The theory of karma and re have is concerned with the soulââ¬â¢s journeying from illusion to reality6. The soul continues from life to life, being reincarnated, until it observes the gross(a) truth; after this the soul is not reborn any more and is united with Brahman. Thus when an individual dies, their mental aspects live on and the next birth is determined by how good or baneful their karma was in the last life.\r\nEvidence frequently cited for this is the fact that many people seem able to hark lynchpin fragments of their antecedent lives, sometime under hypnotic regression.\r\nHowever, although demonstrate for recall can sometimes be damning, why would it seem to suggest evidence for conversion, it could be interpreted as a number of things. Possibly, you could argue that we are all merely cells in one great organism and that these people have just happened to find interconnections between cells. If we removed the cultural-related feasibility of reincarnation then this argument would appear no less likely. In amplification, it is possible that there is a rational invoice for this apparent ââ¬Ërecallââ¬â¢.\r\nFirstly, the individual might scarce be recalling information gained in childhood and attributing it to a past life. Secondly there could be a ââ¬Ëculturalââ¬â¢ gene that passes down information from our ancestors. Or thirdly, that some memories may result from psychological problems and be manifested as memories of earlier lives when in fact they are suppressed events from this life. These three explanations seem relatively wan and unable to explain the multitude of ââ¬Ëregressionsââ¬â¢ which have taken place.\r\nDavid Hume would call into validity the nature of the people who make and verify these claims, stating that either they are religious and seek to prove their beliefs to be true, or are mentally unbalanced and cannot be relied upon to make accurate claims. Furthermore, hypnosis is a very unreliable source of evidence. Numerous psychologists have conducted studies showing that not only are only 33% of the population susceptible to in-depth hypnosis, with 33% being not at all susceptible, but also that false memory board syndrome can occur sooner regularly under hypnosis, where the patient wrongly ââ¬Ëremembersââ¬â¢ an event to have occurred even though it actually has not.7\r\nAlthough this argument does successfully call into doubt the reliability of hypnosis, the legal age of other physical explanations seem relatively ill-defined and fail to affectively account for something â⬠which in all fairness we cannot explain. Yet the fact that we cannot remember why we know something should not provide proof that we have had previous lives, moreover that there are things which we know that transcend our sensory experiences.\r\nPhilosophically, however, there are problems with this style of argument. Human beings seem to require three things to make up their individuality â⬠body, memory and psychological patterns (personal identity). If we apply these to reincarnation, when we are reborn, continuity is lost. If we cannot remember our previous lives then our memory is lost. With only psychological pattern remaining it would be impossible to determine if one person is the changeover of another since, unless they displayed identical characteristics, all we could say is that reincarnated people are ââ¬Ësimilarââ¬â¢ to those who went before.\r\nTherefore given that reincarnation argues not for life after death, just for life per se, it seems irrelevant to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of its arguments.\r\nAnother argument for life after death arises through ââ¬Ëspiritualismââ¬â¢ and intercourse theory between the spirit world and the living is regarded as evidence of life after death. Many ââ¬Ëmediumsââ¬â¢ have passed on messages from departed spirits that contain accurate information which was previously unknown to the medium.\r\nHowever, investigations of a number of mediums have proved that they are frauds. Others appear to be genuine and are able to demonstrate that something comical is happening when they pass on messages. This could be communication with departed spirits or some form of telepathic access to the minds of the living.\r\nOnce again however, the question is introduced as to whether we can trust the testimony of another human being without actually witnessing the occurrence for ourselves. Given the frequency of unexplainable occurrences such as these they do seem be a reasonable argument for life after death.\r\nThere have been a number of ââ¬Ësightingsââ¬â¢ of dead peop le, which also constitute as arguments for life after death. Dr Deepak Chopra stated that bodies are comprised of energy. They may appear to be solid, but the truth is that they are in reality just an impulse of energy. When an individual dies, the energy field may retain his/her kitchen range and may be perceived as a ââ¬Ëghostââ¬â¢. He considered the ghost to be an individualââ¬â¢s consciousness manifesting itself through the remaining energy.\r\nHowever there are a number of explanations for the phenomenon including hoaxes or elaborate tricks, which could convince people they had seen a ghost whereas in actuality they had not. Secondly there is the ââ¬Ëstone video memorializeââ¬â¢ theory which suggests that just as a magnetised tape is able to record events and play them back, in certain conditions, stones will record events and ââ¬Ëplay them backââ¬â¢ when the same conditions are present. Finally there is the fact that ghosts could be the result of a case of ill-judged identity, or the power of suggestion could lead to the mistaken belief that a ghost had been sighted.\r\nThe ââ¬Ëstone tape theoryââ¬â¢ is quite ludicrous as it takes upon a scientific argument to prove a theory when the main differentiation between science and philosophy is existential verification. In this case there is no evidence to support the theory.\r\nAside from this theory, the other two seem quite believable in that they are quite feasible and explain the frequency and physical body of times such an occurrence has taken place.\r\nFurthermore, the fact that a bundle of energy continues to exist, showing something that once did exist does not mean that life after death exists. Indeed if the energy is little more than a reflection of what once was, it fails as an argument intended to prove what know is.\r\nIn addition can a bundle of energy really be constituted as ââ¬Ëlivingââ¬â¢, if not then once again the argument is invalid.\r\nThe argument o f near-death experiences also puts forward an argument for life after death. Dr. Raymond Moody has studied many cases of people who had, to all intents and purposes died (during a surgical operation) and subsequently been resuscitated. Many claimed similar experiences â⬠floating out of their bodies, travelling down a tunnel where they emerged into a world of light.\r\nHowever, these accounts have problems. Firstly, these accounts may be merely the result of people pipe dream or experiencing some subconscious phenomena. Given the lucidness of these dreams the first account seems unlikely, the second more plausible yet still is devoid of scientific evidence to support. Some have suggested that a lack of type O to the brain resulted in this hallucination.\r\nThe main problem once again is verification in that it is impossible for us to experience the phenomena ourselves and judge its reliability fit inly.\r\nIn addition, the types of experiences are often largely dependent on a griculture and society and so whether or not they are genuine or merely a manifestation of what the person may expect to see, or in the case of non-believers, expects not to see.\r\nOne can counter-argue this however by saying that paragon may not actually be a fixed being but more of an interpersonal one variable from person to person and so the culture argument may not be relevant.\r\nThe arguments discussed here are numerous, but generally do not hold a great deal of weight. The philosophical arguments are flawed and in places not logical, and the empirical arguments are generally unverifiable.\r\nHowever, given the sheer number of empirical arguments and the fact that some of them (near death experiences and regression to previous lives for example) are apparently otherwise unexplainable â⬠we must realise that it is highly plausible if not possible that life after death does occur in some form or another.\r\nBibliography:\r\nReligious studies, by Sarah K. Tyler and Gordon Reid.\r\nPhilosophy of religion for A level by Neil Lockyer, Anne Jordan and Edwin Tate.\r\nAn introduction to the philosophy of religion, by Brian Davies.\r\nThe bunk of God by Peter Vardy\r\nReligious direction notes from R.S. league\r\n1 ââ¬Å"Any view that postulates two kinds of thing in some domain is dualist; contrasting views according to which there is only one kind of thing are monisticââ¬Â â⬠Simon Blackburn Oxford Dictionary of philosophy pg 248\r\n2 Greek word meaning ââ¬Ëpurposeââ¬â¢\r\n3 The Puzzle of God â⬠Peter Vardy\r\n4 The outsmart of God â⬠Peter Vardy\r\n5 Religious Education notes from R.S. conference\r\n6 Also known as a state of ââ¬ËNirvanaââ¬â¢.\r\n7 The puzzle of God â⬠Peter Vardy\r\n'
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